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would be for the benefit of the infant, that " she should not be
estranged from her maternal relatives," and that the guardian
appointed in New York should be at liberty, when convenient, to
remove the infant to New York, "for her residence and education,
until the further order of the court, on security to return and
account," &c. This decision was reversed by the Lord Chancellor,
who, on coming to the conclusion to retain the minor in England,
necessarily declined a recognition, even by comity, of the obligation
of the law of the place of her nativity and of her domicil, and of
the forum where guardianship hal been legally determined, before
foreign jurisdiction had been attained. Under the circumstances
attending the removal of the minor from the United States, the
guardian was, in my judgment, entirely justified in proceeding to
England, and making the appropriate appeal, for the restitution of
her ward, to the courts of that country. The decision which has
been rendered, could not well be anticipated. I have no disposition
further to consider it, than has been necessary to show that I am
not called upon by any circumstances properly addressed to judicial
discretion, to forego my jurisdiction over the minor, her guardian
and her property, and to defer to the judgment of the foreign tri-
bunal. The minor was originally, naturally and legitimately, under
the control of our own courts. She was covertly carried away, in
evasion of our laws; and now, to reward at once the act and the
judgment of the foreign court, by sending her property after her,
would be yielding to a spirit of comity, not only where it was not
due, but where it bad been already unacknowledged. I must, there-
fore, direct the allowance of the expenses of the guardian, and
refuse to permit the transmission of the funds of the infant abroad.
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Supreme Court of Alabama.
Damages- Ordinary care.-Ordinary care is altogether a relative
term, and means the use of those precautions which under the circum-
stances of each particular case, a just regard to the persons and property
of others, demands ; but there is no inflexible rule, either of the river or of
the road, the neglect of which by one party will dispense with the exercise
of common caution by the other. Steamboat Farmer vs. XeC Oraw.
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Filcs and Forfeitures-Power of remission is in Executive, and cannot
be exercised by Legislature.-The power to remit fines and forfeitures is
confided by the State constitution to the governor alone, and cannot be
exercised by the Legislature; and therefore any act of the Legislature,
which attempts either directly or indirectly, to remit a fine, either before
or after it has been paid, is unconstitutional. Haley vs. Clark.
Fixture-3-Erectons for agricultural purposes, as between vendor and
vendee.-In the United States, public policy requires, that the same pro-
tection which in England is afforded to fixtures erected for the purposes of
trade, should be extended to erections for agricultural purposes. As be-
tween vendor and vendee, the stationary machinery by which turning
lathes, or other portable machines, which are of equal value everywhere,
are impelled, if erected on the land by the vendor during his ownership,
for his own use, for the purposes of either trade or agriculture, and fixed
in or to the ground, or to some substance which has already become a
part of the freehold, are irremovable fixtures, which pass to the vendee
under his deed for the land. Barkness vs. Sears & Walker.
Husband and Wife-Deed of gift construed to create separate estate in
wife.-A deed of gift, executed in Virginia, in 1824, conveying certain
slaves, in consideration of natural love and affection, to the grantor's
daughter, then a married woman, "and the lawful heirs of her body,"
contained this clause, "I do bind myself, my heirs, &c., to make to the
above named property a clear and undoubted right, as much so as can be
made by word or deed from the claim and claims from every person or
persons whatsoever, to my said daughter and her lawful heirs as above
mentioned" : leld, that the deed created a separate estate in the wife,
and excluded the husband's marital rights. Jenkins vs. 2feConico.
Rusband and Wife- Wi/e's separate personal property, how affected by
joint deed of herseif and husband.-Where personal property is conveyed
directly to the wife to her sole and separate use, she and her husband, by
their joint deed, may vest the legal title in trustees for their use, and the
use of the survivor for life; and the husband, surviving, may set up such
deed to defeat an action of trover brought against him by the wife's
personal representative. lb.
Husband and Wife.- Wife's bond or note, its effect on her separate per-
sonal estate.-If a married woman gives her written obligation for the
payment of money, it will be presumed that she thereby intended to charge
her separate personal estate ; and therefore, if her creditor file a bill in
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equity to obtain payment out of that estate, it is not necessary that he
should either aver or prove her intention to charge it. Ozley vs.
Ikelheimer.
/nfancy.-Infan's deed may be avoided by suit without reJuiding pur-
chase mone.-Although the deed of an infant is voidable only, and not
absolutely void; yet he will not be required, in a court of law, as a pre-
requisite to an avoidance of his deed by suit for the land, to refund the
purchase Imoney, when it is not shown to have been in his possession, either
actually or constructively, after he attained his majority. Manning vs.
..ohnson.
MoMrtgages and conditional sales.-Eguitg leans against conditional sales,
and in favor of mortgages.-The inclination of the courts of equity always
has been, to lean against conditional sales, because an error which converts
a conditional sale into a mortgage, is not as injurious as one which changes
a mortgage into a conditional sale; and this inclination is strongly mani-
fested, whenever the transaction had its origin in a proposition for a loan,
or the relation of debtor and creditor existed between the parties. Locke's
Executor vs. Palmer.
MAortgages and conditional sales.-.Absolute deed declared a mortgage.-
In this case, a deed absolute on its face was declared a mortgage, on proof of
these facts: That the transaction originated in a loan of money, and the
relation of debtor and creditor existed between the parties; that some of
the articles of personal property conveyed were not enumerated in the deed;
that the creditor gave up the debtor's notes, and retained no evidence of
the debt; that the creditor, about two months afterwards, acknowledged
in writing, that, at the time the deed was executed, it was agreed between
them that, if the debtor repaid to him by a specified day the amount ex-
pressed as the consideration in the deed, then he would reconvey all the
property therein mentioned, and bound himself to reconvey accordingly,
and that all the property, both real and personal remained in the debtor's
possession, without any agreement for rent or hire so far as the evidence
disclosed. 1b.
Statutes, Construction of-Meaning of words in statutes same as at
common law.-Wheu words are used in a statute, which, when used in
reference to the same subject, have obtained a fixed and definite meaning
at common law, the inference is, that they .were intended to be used in
their common law sense. Vincent, Ex parte.
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Statutes, construction of-Repealing clause in unconstitutional statute.-
A repealing clause in an unconstitutional statute, declaring 11 that all laws
contravening the provisions of this act be, and the same are hereby
repealed," does not affect the previous laws. Tms vs. The State.
Statutes, Construction of-Computation of time-Statute of Limita-
tions.-In the computation of time under a statute, the settled practice in
this State is, to include one day and exclude the other, unless the statute
requires so many entire days to intervene. Therefore, under thefct of the
7th February, 1843, (which limits actions for the recovery of lands to ten
years after the accrual of the cause of action,) a suit commenced on the
7th February, 1853, is not barred. Owen vs. Slatter.
Statutes, Construction of-Performance of condition precedent.-Difo
ference between public and private statutes.-Where a statute affects a
community, and requires as a condition to its validity that something should
be done before it goes into operation, the act has no force or effect until the
thing required to be done is performed ; but where a statute affects only one
or more designated persons, whether natural or artificial, those interested
in its object may dispense with a preliminary of this character, and claim
the benefit of its provisions, vwithout requiring the performance of the
condition. Savage & Darrington vs. Wfalshe & Emanuel.
Statute of Wills-Difference between enalling and disabling statutes.
Courts will not so construe a statute, when its words do not force them, as
to defeat a devise or bequest, which would have been valid if the testator
had died imrhediately after making it; but as to a statute whose effect is
to sustain rather than to defeat a bequest, a different rule of construction
prevails. toffman vs. Hoffman.
Wills.-By what law governed.-A. will of realty, executed before the
adoptib of the new code of Alabama, is governed by its provisions, if the
testator died since its adoption; but a will of personalty only would be
governed by the old law. Hoffman vs. Hoffman. NoTE, that the code
of 1852, (§1611) requires two witnesses to a will disposing of either real
or personal property; while the former law required three witnesses to a
will of realty, and none at all to a will of personalty.
Wills-Residuary legacy.-Share which lapses by death does vot survive.
Wherd one of several residuary legatees, who take in common, dies before
the testtor, his legacy, which lapses by his death, does not survive to his
co-legatees, but descends to the testator's next of kin under the statute of
distribution, and no interest in it passes to one who takes a life estate by
implication in the residuum. Hamlet vs. Johnson.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Wils-Residuary legacy-Express bequest of lfe estate converts super-
addedrightofdisposition into merepower..-Atestator, inter alia, bequeathed
to his wife several negroes, all his household and kitchen furniture, stocks of
horses, cattle, &c., "all of which she is to have and hold during her
natural life, and at her death to dispose of at her will and pleasure."
There was no residuary clause, and no bequest over in default of disposi-
tion by the wife. Held, that the widow took but a life estate in the pro-
perty, with power to dispose of the remainder; and she having died intes-
tate, that the property went to the testator's personal representative, to be
by him administered as in case of intestacy. Denson vs. Mitchell and
Will-Remoteness-" Die without heirs of the body" construed to mean
indefinitefailure of issue.-Testator bequeathed all his property, real and
personal, to his wife during her natural life, "with the following exceptions:
I give and bequeath the special legacies to my three daughters hereinafter
named. I give my daughter Frances, one negro girl named Maria; to my
daughter Lena, one negro girl named Aggy; and to my daughter Mary
Ann one negro boy named Alick; which latter named negro I give to
Mary Ann, and to the heirs of her body, and in the event that she should
die without any such heirs, it is my will, that said boy return to my estate
to be disposed of as the rest of my property. It is further my will, that
at the death of my wife, the whole of my estate, both real and personal,
be equally divided among my living children, or to the living heirs of their
body, the three above named daughters to receive an equal proportion in
common with the rest of my children, notwithstanding the above named
special legacies; provided, however, that the portion falling to Mary Ann
be subject to the same requirements that are made in reference to the boy
Alick." Mary Ann was unmarried at the time this will was executed,
and also at the testator's death, but she afterwards married, and had one
child born, who died before her; and upon her death, without issue sur-
viving her, the surviving children and grandchildren of the testator brought
detinue against her husband for the boy Alick. Held, that the words of
the will must be construed in their legal sense, to mean an indefinite
failure of issue, and therefore the limitation over was void for remoteness,
and Mary Ann took the absolute interest in Alick. Landman vs.
,Snodgrass.
